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Abstract
Using survey data, we document that foreign-owned institutions became more pes-
simistic than locally owned institutions about the strength of the Brazilian currency
around the 2002 presidential elections. As a result of their relative pessimism, foreign-
owned institutions made larger forecast errors. Consistent with the emergence of their
relative pessimism, foreign investors heavily sold Brazilian stocks and the Brazilian cur-
rency in futures markets ahead of the 2002 elections. Periods of stronger foreign sell-o¤
were associated with larger equity price declines and larger depreciation of the Brazilian
Real in spot and futures markets. These results are consistent with foreign investors
lack of knowledge of Brazilian institutions contributing to the sharp depreciation of the
Brazilian currency and stock market ahead of the 2002 presidential elections.
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1 Introduction
The crises of the 1990s engendered a substantial change of perspective in the analysis of
emerging market crises. Before, crises were quickly attributed to macroeconomic misman-
agement, particularly to unsustainable scal imbalances. Afterward, economists began to
seriously consider that some crises may be precipitated by self-fullling pessimistic expec-
tations of foreign lenders. For example, a number of prominent economists blamed foreign
investors for their role in the 1997 East Asian emerging market crisis (Bhagwati, 1998;
Stiglitz, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). Self-fullling lender-led crises can be
rationalized by a variety of models, all of them exhibiting multiple equilibria. These models
include those of Obstfeld (1986, 1996), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Cole and Kehoe
(1996, 2000), Calvo and Mendoza (2000a,b), Chang and Velasco (2001), and Chang (2007).1
Along with a new generation of theoretical models, the crises of the 1990s stimulated a spurt
of empirical research on the behavior of foreign investors in emerging markets, especially
during crises. A short list of papers in this literature includes Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999),
Kim and Wei (2002a,b), Borensztein and Gelos (2003), Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler
(2004), Dvorak (2005), Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006), and Froot and Ramadorai (2008).
Two questions that permeate this line of research are whether foreign investorstrading is
less information-based than that of locals, and whether trading by foreigners exacerbates
crises in emerging markets. As we discuss later, evidence is mixed. Our study adds one data
point to this literature. A novel feature of our work is the use of surveys of expectations of
nancial market participants. These surveys are conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil
and include the major players in local nancial markets.
1See Masson (1999), Calvo (2005, chapter 12), and Kaminsky (2006) for discussion.
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We use surveys to compare the exchange rate expectations of locally and foreign-owned
institutions around the 2002 Brazilian presidential elections.2 Reports from that time reveal
that expectations were heavily inuenced by the potential victory of Luís Inácio "Lula"
da Silva, a left-wing opposition candidate who emerged victorious in the elections.3 We
document that during that time period foreign-owned institutions were more pessimistic
than locally owned ones about the strength of the Brazilian currency and made considerably
larger forecast errors accordingly. For example, between August 2002 and February 2003,
foreignersestimates for the USD/BRL exchange rate at the end of 2004 were on average
0:186 (BRL) cents above localsestimates, with the di¤erence being statistically signicant
at the 5% level. Using the average USD/BRL spot exchange rate in the forecasting period
(3:498), the 0:186 di¤erence means that, relative to locally owned institutions, foreign-owned
institutions, on average, forecasted a 0:186=3:498 = 0:053 larger depreciation of the Brazilian
Real.
We also document that foreignerstrading activity in nancial markets was consistent with
their expectations becoming more pessimistic than those of locals. Data on trading imbal-
ances show that foreign investors substantially sold Brazilian equity and Brazilian currency
(in the futures market) to local investors ahead of the 2002 presidential elections. Further-
more, we show that 10-day periods with stronger foreign sales (i.e., local purchases) of equity
were associated with larger concurrent equity price reductions and larger depreciations of
2Brazilian presidential elections occur in two rounds. All candidates participated in the rst round, on October 6,
2002. The two top candidates from the rst round, Jose Serra, from the incumbent centrist coalition, and Lula from
the leftist WorkersParty, faced o¤ in the second round. On October 27, 2002 Lula was elected president, and his
government would not break o¤ from the macroeconomic policies of previous administrations.
3On June 6, 2002 Goldman Sachs announced the Lulameter, which "quanties the probability of a Lula victory
that is currently being priced in by currency markets" (Tenengauzer, 2002). The report concludes that "the market
is being over-optimistic regarding the exchange rate in the event of a Lula victory" and recommends that "investors
should protect against BRL exposure into the elections period." Martinez and Santiso (2003) present a thorough and
enjoyable discussion of the Brazilian pre-electoral period in 2002.
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the Brazilian currency in the spot market; days with stronger foreign sales of BRL in futures
markets were associated with larger depreciation of the Brazilian currency in the futures
market. When coupled with survey evidence, these results indicate that the foreign sell-o¤
likely exacerbated the depreciation of Brazilian equity and the Brazilian Real ahead of the
elections.4
1.1 Related literature
In this paper, evidence that foreigners had "worse" expectations than locals during the
Brazilian crisis in 2002 comes from survey data. In contrast, many studies address the ulti-
mate question of whether foreign trading during a crisis is less information-based than that
of locals by testing whether foreign investors engage in "momentum trading" or "herding
behavior." These would be mechanical ways of trading that disregard economic fundamen-
tals.5
For example, Kim and Wei (2002a) and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) use di¤erent datasets
to test whether foreign investors in Korea tended to herd and follow momentum-like strate-
gies in the period around the 1997 East Asian crisis. Kim and Wei (2002a) nd evidence of
herding and momentum before and during the crisis, whereas Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999)
nd that foreigners engaged in momentum trading and herding prior to the crisis, but during
4A dollar invested in the Brazilian IBOVESPA Stock Index in January 1, 2002 was worth 38 cents in September
30, 2002. Value was lost both because the IBOVESPA index lost 36% of its value in BRL and because the Brazilian
Real lost 40% of its value relative to the dollar.
5One di¢ culty with this approach is that the statistical results used to identify herding and momentum are also
consistent with fully rational trading strategies that use information e¢ ciently. "Herding" could be due to investors
responding to the same information. "Momentum-trading" could be due to investors following dynamic trading
strategies that create convex payo¤ patterns (i.e., portfolio insurance a la Leland 1980), or to foreign investors and
market prices responding to a gradual build-up of credibility regarding a government commitment not to expropriate
foreigners (Cherian and Perotti, 2001), or to informed investors breaking up orders to minimize the price impact of
their trades (Kyle, 1985).
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the crisis herding was somewhat reduced and momentum trading disappeared. Choe, Kho,
and Stulz (1999) also document a strong foreign sell-o¤ and large price declines during the
crisis. Authors of both articles conclude that foreign trading probably did not exacerbate
the crisis either because foreigners held a relatively small part of the Korean stock market
capitalization (Kim and Wei, 2002a), or because, within the crisis period, days with large
foreign net selling were not associated with more negative returns (Choe, Kho, and Stulz,
1999).6 Borensztein and Gelos (2003) use data on holdings of mutual funds investing in
emerging markets and conclude that foreign investors engage in momentum trading and
herding behavior. Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004) also document momentum trad-
ing by U.S. mutual funds investing in emerging markets and show that this behavior is due
both to customer ows and portfolio decisions by mutual fund managers.
Other than checking whether foreign investors follow seemingly mechanistic trading strate-
gies, there are three alternative ways to assess the informational content of foreign trading.
First, Frankel and Schmukler (1996, 2000) propose comparing the prices of closed-end coun-
try funds trading in the U.S. to the underlying prices of their emerging markets stocks. They
conclude that locals are better informed than foreigners because emerging market stock prices
lead closed-end fund prices.
Second, several authors investigate the relation between foreign trading ows and future
returns. Evidence is mixed. Using daily ows of institutional investors in and out of 44
di¤erent countries, Froot, OConnell, and Seasholes (2001) nd evidence consistent with mo-
mentum trading, but because foreign purchases forecast future returns, they conclude that
6 In contrast, Richards (2005) and Wang (2007) use East Asian data after the crisis and document large returns in
days of strong foreign trading, and suggest that price pressure from foreign trading can create potentially large price
dislocations.
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foreigners are likely to trade based on information not possessed by locals. In a follow-up
paper, Froot and Ramadorai (2008) study the relation between cross-border equity ows
and domestic and foreign equity returns and reach the same conclusion. However, other
authors use di¤erent data sets and statistical techniques to address the same ultimate ques-
tion and reach the opposite conclusion, namely, that local investors are better informed than
foreigners (e.g., Hau, 2001; Gri¢ n, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 2005;
Dvorak, 2005; Menkho¤and Schmeling, 2008). In an attempt to reconcile the conicting evi-
dence, Froot and Ramadorai (2008) conjecture that foreigners have better information about
macro fundamentals in emerging markets, whereas locals have better information about how
individual rms relate to each other.
The third way to verify whether foreigners trade on the basis of "worse" information sets
than locals is to use survey data to directly compare the expectations of locals and foreigners.
Once again, the evidence is mixed. MacDonald and Marsh (1996) use survey data to compare
G7 exchange rate forecasts made by nancial institutions located in di¤erent countries.
While documenting substantial heterogeneity among individual forecasts, MacDonald and
Marsh (1996) nd negligible di¤erences among forecasts averaged across di¤erent forecasting
locations.7 In contrast, Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) nd that forecasters from
Frankfurt (where the European Central Bank is located) perform substantially better than
other European forecasters when predicting monetary policy in the Euro area. Using data
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) show
that local analysts tend to make smaller forecast errors than foreign analysts when predicting
rm-specic earnings. In contrast, Bacmann and Bolliger (2001) use a subset of the I/B/E/S
7Other studies using surveys of exchange rate expectations include Frankel and Froot (1987), Ito (1990), Cavaglia,
Verschoor, and Wol¤ (1993,1994), Chinn and Frankel (1994), Koedijk and Wol¤ (1996), Elliott and Ito (1999), and
Bacchetta, Mertens, and van Wincoop (2009).
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data and nd that foreign analysts outperform local ones when forecasting earnings of Latin
American rms, with the foreign outperformance being statistically signicant for Mexico
and Colombia.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst study using survey data to document local in-
formational advantage when it comes to forecasting a macroeconomic variable (the exchange
rate).8 Moreover, because the divergence of expectations between locals and foreigners hap-
pened around presidential elections (but not in other times) and foreign underperformance
is due to their relative pessimism, we can narrow down the source of the local advantage. To
wit, foreigners where over-pessimistic regarding the Brazilian economy following a potential
victory by Lula in the elections. This links our paper to the literature examining the ef-
fect of political uncertainty on emerging nancial markets. This literature includes Alesina
and Tabellini (1989), Martinez and Santiso (2003), Block and Vaaler (2004), Bonomo and
Terra (2005), Chang (2006, 2007, forthcoming), Leblang and Satyanath (2008), and Andrade
(2009).
2 Exchange Rate Forecasts
We rely on exchange rate forecasts obtained from monthly surveys conducted by the Central
Bank of Brazil. Practically all major players in the Brazilian xed income currency markets
participate in the survey. Since November 2001 the forecasts have been sent to the Central
Bank via an electronic system. The identity of the ve best forecasting institutions over
8Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2005) show that expectations of managers of local rms can help improve
exchange rate forecasts based on macroeconomic variables. Menkho¤ and Schmeling (2008) show that order ow
from Moscow and St. Petersburg has a more persistent impact on the RUR/USD exchange rate than order ows
from other regions.
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the recent past is made public on a regular basis to give institutions an incentive to deliver
their best forecasts. Reecting the surveys high prole, aggregate statistics of the forecasts
are widely reported by the Central Bank and the national press. The forecasts of individual
institutions, to which we have access under a non-disclosure agreement with the Central
Bank of Brazil, are kept condential. A detailed description of the survey can be found in
Marques, Fachada and Cavalcanti (2003).
The Central Bank of Brazil asks institutions participating in the surveys to, every month,
forecast the future BRL price of one dollar at di¤erent target dates. We study surveys from
January 2002 to June 2003, focusing on forecasts for the exchange rate 12 months ahead and
at the end of 2003, 2004, and 2005. The survey data consist of an unbalanced panel because
not all institutions input answers for all target dates at all times. The average number of
months in the January 2002 to June 2003 (18 months) in which a forecaster submits at least
one forecast (for some target date) is 12:4, while the median is 16.
There are 103 di¤erent forecasting institutions in our sample period. Most of these (88)
are nancial institutions, including banks and asset management rms. The remaining
institutions are either economic consulting rms (9) or large non-nancial rms (6). We
classify each forecasting institution as being locally owned or foreign-owned. There are 60
locally owned institutions, and 43 foreign-owned ones. Foreign-owned institutions include
banks such as Citibank, Bank Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Deutsche Bank, and JP Morgan; economic
consulting rms such as IDEA Global; and non-nancial rms such as Telefónica.
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2.1 Forecast Heterogeneity and Its Likely Source
We begin by documenting a large increase in the dispersion of exchange rate forecasts around
Brazils 2002 presidential election, after pooling locally and foreign-owned institutions. Fig-
ure 1 shows that the coe¢ cient of variation of exchange rate forecasts peaks at the election
period for all forecast horizons. For all horizons, the coe¢ cient of variation is about 2:5
times larger around October 2002 than at the beginning (January 2002) or at the end (June
2003) of the sample period. This conrms that uncertainties stemming from the presiden-
tial election were the driving force of the heterogeneity of beliefs during our sample period.
The basic uncertainties were whether Lula would be elected president, and if he was elected
president, whether he would retain the basic macroeconomic framework of his predecessors.
FIGURE 1
We observe expectations, but not information sets. Therefore, we cannot unequivocally tell
whether the heterogeneity we document is mostly due to di¤erent private information or
mostly due to agents interpreting public information in di¤erent ways. However, given the
nature of the basic uncertainties bedeviling Brazilian markets at the time (regarding the out-
come of the presidential election, or regarding Lulas macroeconomic framework if elected),
we are more sympathetic to the view that agents at the time had access to essentially the
same information but "agreed to disagree" on its interpretation.9 As Harris and Raviv (1993)
state on page 474: "People often share common information yet disagree as to the meaning
9 In the context of the U.S. presidential election of 2008, Moretti and Lee (2009) study the relation between
publically released poll information and prices in prediction markets. The authors show that rather than anticipating
how the forthcoming polling numbers might be, prices in prediction markets used the changes in polls to update
their forecasts of the nal election outcome. Their evidence suggests there was no private information regarding the
outcome of the election.
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of this information, not only in the evaluation of risky assets but also in the evaluation of
political candidates, economic policies, and the outcome of horse races. One example of this
is the variety of opinions among nancial analysts and macroeconomists regarding future
movements of interest rates, exchange rates, gross national product, and stock prices despite
the fact that all these analysts have access to the same economic data."10
2.2 Divergence of Forecasts Between Locally and Foreign-Owned Institutions
The pooled dispersion statistics discussed above mask an important divergence of forecasts
between groups of investors taking place around the 2002 presidential elections. In fact, there
is plenty of anecdotal evidence that foreigners had more pessimistic economic scenarios for
the Brazilian economy than locals. Two weeks ahead of the runo¤ election between Lula and
the incumbent coalitions candidate, the New York Times reported: "Wall Street investors,
stung by recent losses in Argentina and wary of the outcome of presidential elections in
Brazil, are once again diverging from their Brazilian counterparts in their outlook on the
nations ability to avoid a crippling nancial crisis. The di¤erences in opinion [...] have
become more striking since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the presidential candidate of the left-
leaning WorkersParty, was forced on Sunday into a second round of voting with José Serra,
the candidate of the centrist governing party" (Romero, 2002).
In Figures 2 through 5 we use the Central Bank surveys to verify whether the anecdotal
di¤erence of opinions between local and foreigners was indeed of a systematic nature. Each
month we compute the average forecast from locally and foreign-owned institutions for our
four target dates and plot both average forecasts against the future realized exchange rate.
10See also Kandel and Pearson (1995).
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At any point in time, the distance between each average forecast and the future realized
exchange rate is the forecast error. Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 show that locally owned institutions
made smaller forecast errors for all four target dates.
FIGURE 2 to 5
For all of the target dates, the major factor behind the forecasting underperformance of
foreign-owned institutions was their relative pessimism in the period of August 2002 to
February 2003 (i.e., higher forecasts for future BRL price of 1 USD.)11 It seems that relative
to local institutions, foreign ones overreacted to the prospect of a Lula victory, which became
increasingly likely after national broadcasting of campaign advertisements (and thus the
o¢ cial campaigning period) started in July 2002.12
Table 1 reports the results of tests of whether the di¤erences between forecasts of locally
and foreign-owned institutions in the August 2002 to February 2003 period are statistically
signicant. For each of the four target dates, we regressed the individual exchange rate
forecasts against a foreign-owned institution dummy variable labeled Foreign Dummy. We
include month e¤ects, i.e., a di¤erent dummy variable for each month in which the forecast
was made. This controls for the fact that we pool forecasts made at di¤erent months. We
report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by forecasting
11The gure for 12-months-ahead forecasts suggests that locally owned institutions became more bearish than
foreign-owned ones a few months before August 2002, leading to smaller forecast errors in that period. However,
apart from the end of 2003 and the end of 2004 forecasts made in July 2002, the gures for the other target dates do
not show notable di¤erences between local and foreign forecasts prior to August 2002.
12Based on the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and the ndings of Borensztein and Gelos
(2003), one could be tempted to conclude that the forecast divergence between locals and foreigners might be at-
tributed to greater rational inattention on the part of foreign forecasters. This view however is not warranted: while
individual foreign forecasters changed their forecast in 77:5% of the months, locals did so in 78:3%.
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institution.
TABLE 1
The OLS regressions in Panel A show that the divergence of forecasts between locally and
foreign-owned institutions illustrated by Figures 2 through 5 was indeed statistically sig-
nicant. Foreign Dummy is statistically signicant for all target dates. Panel A results
also indicate that the divergence of expectations is economically signicant. For example,
foreignersestimates for the BRL price of 1 USD at the end of 2004 were on average 0:186
(BRL) cents above localsestimates. Using the average USD/BRL spot exchange rate in the
forecasting period (3:498), the 0:186 di¤erence means that, relative to locals, foreigners on
average forecasted a 0:186=3:498 = 0:053 larger depreciation of the Brazilian Real.13
The median regressions in Panel B conrm the results of the OLS regressions in Panel A,
since Foreign Dummy remains statistically signicant for all target dates. This shows that
the results in Panel A are not driven by a few outliers. In untabulated OLS regressions,
we perform three additional robustness checks. First, we regress the log of the exchange
rate forecasts and verify that Foreign Dummy remains statistically signicant for all four
forecasting target dates. Second, we add a dummy variable equal to 1 if the forecasting
institution is a nancial one, and equal to 0 otherwise. Results are unchanged: Foreign
Dummy remains statistically signicant for all four target dates, and the nancial institution
dummy variable is insignicant for all target dates. Third, we remove institutions with less
than 6 forecasts in the January 2002 to June 2003 period from the sample and verify that the
13Given their "Lulameter," it is interesting to check Goldman Sachsforecasts for the BRL/USD exchange rate in
October 2002. We collect forecasts in the October 8, 2002 and the November 12, 2002 editions of their Goldmans
Global FX Analyst publication. In both editions, Goldmans forecasts for the BRL price of 1 USD 12 months in the
future were 4.40. The average local and foreign forecasts were, respectively, 3.51 and 3.66 (October 2002) and 3.60 and
3.74 (November 2002). Goldman Sachs made much larger forecast errors than the average locally and foreign-owned
institutions in our sample.
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results are unchanged: Foreign Dummy remains statistically signicant for all four target
dates.
3 Foreign Trading Imbalances and Market Prices
It seems natural that the divergence of expectations between locally and foreign-owned
institutions would generate trading activity in nancial markets. In this section we document
that nancial market data are consistent with foreigners becoming relatively more pessimistic
than locals ahead of the 2002 elections. Using data on trading imbalances in the Brazilian
stock exchange (BOVESPA) and the Brazilian exchange rate futures market (BM&F), we
document that foreigners were net sellers of Brazilian stocks and the Brazilian currency
ahead of the elections (i.e., locals were net buyers).
Did the foreign sell-o¤ exacerbate the depreciation of Brazilian equity and currency values?
Admittedly, it is very hard to provide an unequivocal empirical answer to this question. In
this section we test whether periods of stronger foreign sell-o¤ (i.e., local buys) are associated
with larger equity and currency declines. If foreign sales were unrelated to returns, the case
for a worsening of price declines caused by foreign selling would be much weaker.14 However,
we nd that periods of stronger foreign sell-o¤ were indeed associated with larger equity
price declines and larger depreciation of the Brazilian Real in spot and futures markets.
Coupled with the survey results, this suggests that foreign trading exacerbated the decline
in Brazilian equity and currency values during the crisis.
14This is what Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) report. They state on page 231: "During the last three months of
1997 [the crisis period], days with large foreign net selling do not have signicant market-adjusted returns; even raw
returns on these days are not signicantly negative. There is therefore no convincing evidence that foreign investors
play a destabilizing role."
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3.1 Stock Market
The BOVESPA Stock Exchange classies each participant in a stock trade as a domestic or
a foreign trader. The exchange divulges data on the BRL amount transacted by each type of
trader in both stock purchases and stock sales separately. The data is aggregated across all
stocks in non-overlapping 10-day periods adding up to 36 periods per year.15 We construct
a Foreign Buys-Sells trading imbalance variable by subtracting the total BRL volume of
sells by foreigners from the total BRL volume of buys by foreign investors in a given 10-
day period. The variable is in billions of BRL. Figure 6 plots Foreign Buys-Sells and the
corresponding level of the IBOVESPA Stock Index from January 2002 to December 2003.
FIGURE 6
Figure 6 shows that, on average, Foreign Buys-Sells is negative during the sample period.
In particular, there was a sequence of large net foreign sales from mid-May to early October
2002, coinciding with a steep decline in the IBOVESPA Stock Index from about 12; 500 to
about 8; 500. Using the total BRL trading volume on the exchange in that period, we calculate
that, on average in that period, foreign sells and foreign buys represented, respectively, 29:9%
and 24:8% of all trades. Thus, excess foreign sales accounted for 5:1% of total trading volume
at BOVESPA from mid-May to early October 2002. The foreign sell-o¤ of Brazilian equity
is consistent with foreigners becoming relatively more pessimistic than locals about the
Brazilian economy, as indicated by survey data.
15Naturally, the total BRL volume of buys aggregated across trader types in a given period is equal to the total
BRL volume of sells aggregated across trader types in the same period.
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Table 2 below examines the relation between Foreign Buys-Sells and contemporaneous stock
returns and percent changes in the USD price of 1 BRL. We label these variables IBOVESPA
Returns and BRL Appreciation, respectively. We study the relation between these variables
both in 2002, a period in which markets were inuenced by the presidential elections, as well
as in the more tranquil period of 2003-2004.
TABLE 2
The rst two columns of Table 2 show that, during 2002, periods of high foreign sales of
equity to locals were associated with larger declines in Brazilian stock prices and the Brazilian
currency. The R2s of the univariate regressions are 0:47 and 0:30, respectively. These results
are consistent with the emergence of the relative pessimism of foreigners, prompting them to
sell Brazilian equity to locals, thus exerting downward pressure on stock prices. Moreover,
in order to repatriate the proceeds of the stock sales, foreigners need to buy USD in the local
spot market. Large repatriation trades following stock sales, plus possibly other correlated
foreign purchases of dollars, may have exerted downward pressure on the Brazilian Real. This
is consistent with the positive correlation between Foreign Buys-Sells and BRL Appreciation
shown in Table 2.
Admittedly, the results in Table 2 in isolation do not allow us to conclude that foreign selling
exacerbated equity depreciation during the 2002 Brazilian crisis. It is possible that bad public
news about the Brazilian economy drove both equity declines and foreign sales (i.e., local
buys). In this case, equity declines would have been the same had foreigners not sold equity,
because price changes would only reect the incorporation of public information into prices.
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For example, Brennan and Cao (1997) propose an elegant model in which foreign investors
receive less precise information than local investors, and in which Foreign Buys-Sells can
be either positively or negatively correlated with contemporaneous returns. The sign of the
correlation critically depends on whether the foreign information disadvantage arises from
less precise signals received in the current period or from an accumulation of less precise
signals received in the past. In the latter case, Brennan and Caos theory can explain the
positive contemporaneous correlation between Foreign Buys-Sells and IBOVESPA returns
documented by us without our contention that the foreign sell-o¤ contributed to the sharp
decline in Brazilian asset values.
However, our evidence includes not only the regressions in Table 2 but also the survey data
previously discussed, and perhaps the anecdotal evidence provided by the New York Times
article (Romero 2002). Survey data show that foreigners became relatively more pessimistic
than locals ahead of the 2002 elections. This relative change in beliefs is consistent with the
overall foreign sales documented here and the correlation between Foreign Buys-Sells and
IBOVESPA returns shown in Table 2. Integrating the survey and regression results, the
evidence suggests that foreign sales during the crisis exacerbated equity declines; i.e., equity
declines would have been smaller had foreigners not become more pessimistic than locals
and sold equity accordingly.16
In the last two columns of Table 2 we provide additional evidence that the 2002 period,
marked by the emergence of foreign pessimism, was indeed di¤erent from other, less turbu-
16Note that the survey results are inconsistent with Brennan and Caos (1997) theory. In their model, noise
in signals is uncorrelated across investors. Therefore, expectations averaged across (large) groups of investors are
identical because noise cancels out. That is, even though foreigners in Brennan and Caos (1997) model have larger
condence intervals around their expectations, on average they hold the same point estimates as locals. See Rubinstein
(1974) and Dunne, Hau, and Moore (forthcoming) for models in which (exogenous) relative changes in beliefs drive
trading and asset prices.
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lent periods. The table shows that, in the non-crisis 2003-2004 period, Foreign Buys-Sells
was much less contemporaneously correlated with both IBOVESPA Returns and BRL Ap-
preciation than during 2002. The R2s of the univariate regressions drop from 0:47 and 0:30
to 0:08 and 0:01, respectively. More important, the slope coe¢ cient in the non-crisis period
(0:039) is ve times smaller than the slope coe¢ cient during 2002 (0:183), meaning that for a
foreign net sale of a given BRL size, contemporaneous stock price declines were much more
modest in 2003-2004 compared to 2002. This suggests that the mechanism by which foreign
imbalances are correlated with stock returns was di¤erent in 2002 compared to other, more
tranquil periods.
3.2 Futures Exchange
In this section we repeat the analysis of the previous section using data from the BRL/USD
market at the Brazilian BM&F futures exchange rather than stock market data.17 The
exchange classies each position (long or short) as being held by a local or a foreign trader.
For each future contract type, the exchange divulges the total number of long positions and
the total number of short positions for each type of trader each day.18 We add the foreign
net (long BRL) position across all BRL/USD future contracts in a given day. In Figure 7
we plot the time evolution of the resulting Foreign Net BRL position (in USD billion) and
compare it to the evolution of the BRL price of 1 USD according to the futures contract of
the nearest maturity. Note that foreigners held a negative net long position in BRL during
17As Ventura and Garcia (2009) explain, the Brazilian exchange rate futures market is particularly important
because regulatory restrictions prevent many agents from trading in the spot market. As a result, the futures market,
especially the nearest maturity contract, has higher trading volume and narrower bid-ask spreads than the spot
market. Moreover, Ventura and Garcia (2009) provide evidence that price discovery tends to happen in the futures
market and then be transmitted to the spot market by arbitrage.
18Naturally, for each futures contract type at any given time, the total number of long positions is equal to the
total number of short positions.
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2002; i.e., they were short BRL in the BM&F futures market. This is consistent with a
structural desire to hedge the exchange rate exposure of investments in Brazil.
FIGURE 7
Figure 7 shows that foreigners increased their short BRL position throughout 2002, reaching
a peak of about $1:7 billion USD by October 2002. The increase in foreign short positions
coincides with a sharp depreciation in the Brazilian currency in the futures market and is
consistent with the emergence of foreign pessimism found in survey data.
Table 3 reports the results of our investigation of the relation between changes in the foreign
net BRL long position, labeled Changes in Net Foreign BRL Position, and changes in the
future USD-denominated price of 1 BRL for the nearest maturity future contract, labeled
BRL Appreciation. Apart from month-ends when the nearest maturity futures contract
expires and thus both long and short positions in that contract expire, Changes in Net
Foreign BRL Position is positive on days in which foreigners buy more BRL in the futures
market than they sell. We add a New Month Dummy variable to the right-hand side of the
regression equation to account for the expiration of the nearest maturity future contract,
which changes the future contract used in the calculation of BRL Appreciation.
TABLE 3
The rst column of Table 3 shows that Changes in Net Foreign BRL Position is positively
associated with BRL Appreciation in the futures market in 2002. This is consistent with the
18
foreign sell-o¤of Brazilian currency in the futures market, driven by the emergence of foreign
pessimism, exerting downward pressure on the Brazilian Real. Once again, the trading
and price change data alone do not allow us to unequivocally state that foreign trading
exacerbated the depreciation of the Brazilian currency in the futures market. However, this
seems to be the most reasonable explanation, given the evidence from survey data.
The second column of Table 3 examines the relation between Changes in Net Foreign BRL
Position and BRL Appreciation in the more tranquil 2003-2004 period. The table shows
that both are still positively correlated. However, similar to the evidence from the stock
market, the slope coe¢ cient in 2003-2004 is much smaller compared to 2002. Thus, data
on exchange rate futures also suggest that the mechanism by which foreign imbalances are
correlated with price changes was di¤erent in 2002 compared to less turbulent periods. Our
contention is that the emergence of foreign pessimism shown in survey data caused excess
foreign sales to locals, which caused equity and currency values to depreciate beyond what
would have obtained had foreigners held the same expectations as locals.
4 Concluding Remarks
Particularly in young democracies, political factors can dominate economic scenarios during
election times. If the political preferences of parties and leaders are not common knowledge,
expectations of market participants may diverge. In particular, foreign investors may be
prone to forming excessively pessimistic expectations when faced with uncertain political
preferences. To the extent that short-term capital inows nance a large portion of local
long-term investment projects, these pessimistic expectations may become self-fullling and
19
precipitate a nancial crisis.
We use survey data on exchange rate expectations of major players in the Brazilian market
to show that, relative to locally owned institutions, foreign-owned institutions became exces-
sively pessimistic ahead of the 2002 presidential elections. Foreign pessimism led to larger
forecast errors. Consistent with the emergence of foreign pessimism, foreign investors heavily
sold Brazilian equity and Brazilian currency ahead of the elections, likely contributing to the
sharp depreciation in equity and currency values in that period. While our results do not
settle the debate concerning the relative importance of local macroeconomic fragilities versus
foreign investorspanic in explaining emerging market crises, the additional data point we
provide helps to strengthen the latter factor vis-à-vis the former one.
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Table 1: Local vs. Foreign Forecasts of the BRL price of 1 USD  
Table has results of regressions of forecasts of the BRL price of 1 USD 12- months ahead, or at the end of 
2003, 2004, or 2005. Forecasts were made in the August/2002 to February/2003 period. Panel A has OLS 
regressions and Panel B has median regressions. Foreign Dummy is equal to 1 if the forecasting 
institution is foreign-owned, and 0 if it is locally owned. Month Effects represent a dummy variable for 
each of the 7 months in the sample period. OLS standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the forecasting institution level. Median regression standard errors are bootstrapped 10,000 
times with clustering at the forecasting institution level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. OLS Regressions 
 
12 months ahead End of 2003 End of 2004 End of 2005
Foreign Dummy 0.100 * 0.092 * 0.186 ** 0.243 **
(1.84)       (1.80)       (2.20)       (2.16)      
Month Effects yes yes yes yes
Number of Forecasts 367 448 338 279
Number of Forecasters 82 85 67 54
R2 0.49 0.46 0.39 0.33  
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Median Regressions 
 
12 months ahead End of 2003 End of 2004 End of 2005
Foreign Dummy 0.128 ** 0.100 ** 0.200 ** 0.250 *
(2.56)       (1.97)       (1.97)       (1.91)      
Month Effects yes yes yes yes
Number of Forecasts 367 448 338 279
Number of Forecasters 82 85 67 54
Pseudo‐R2 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.24  
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Table 2: Foreign Trading Imbalances at BOVESPA and Changes in Market Prices 
Table has results of regressions of changes in market prices on contemporaneous trading imbalances at 
the BOVESPA Stock Exchange. Imbalances and market price changes are for non-overlapping 10-day 
periods. Percent changes in the IBOVESPA Stock Level are labeled IBOVESPA Returns and percent 
changes in the USD price of 1 BRL are labeled changes Brazilian Real Appreciation. Foreign Buys-Sells, 
the foreign trading imbalance at BOVESPA, is denominated in BRL billions. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. There is no evidence of autocorrelation of residuals. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
IBOVESPA 
returns
BRL Appreciation IBOVESPA 
returns
BRL Appreciation
 Foreign Buys‐Sells 0.183 *** 0.135 *** 0.039 ** 0.007 
(5.54)       (3.23)       (2.17)     (1.00)    
Constant 0.004      ‐0.005     0.008     0.003 
(0.54)      (‐0.66)      (1.33)     (1.18)    
N 0.47      0.30 0.08     0.01
R2 36      36 72     72
Jan/2002 ‐ Dec/2002 Jan/2003 ‐ Dec/2005
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Table 3: Changes in Foreign Net USD Position at BM&F and Changes in Market Prices 
Table has results of regressions of daily percent changes in the USD price of 1 BRL. The price is the end-
of-day settlement price for the nearest maturity future contract at the BM&F futures exchange. Change in 
Foreign Net USD Position is denominated in USD billion, and includes exchange rate futures contracts of 
all maturities. New Month Dummy is equal to 1 at the first trading day of each month, when the contract 
defined as the “nearest” changes. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. There is no evidence of 
autocorrelation of residuals. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Jan/2002 ‐ Dec/2002 Jan/2003 ‐ Dec/2005
BRL appreciation 
(nearest future 
contract)
BRL Appreciation 
(nearest future 
contract)
Change in Foreign Net BRL Position 0.046 *** 0.017 ***
(6.21)       (9.69)      
New Month Dummy 0.011      ‐0.011 ***
(0.74)       (‐4.11)      
Constant ‐0.002 ** 0.001 **
(‐2.19)      (3.17)     
N 248 499
R2 0.16 0.26  
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Figures 1 to 4.    Local vs. Foreign Forecasts of BRL price of 1 USD        
         (from January/2002 to June/2003) 
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Figure 5.    Foreign Trading Imbalances at BOVESPA 
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Figure 6.    Foreign Net BRL Position at BM&F’s Exchange Rate Futures Market 
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